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We the people of the United States, in order to form a 
more perfect union, ... do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America. 
— Preamble, U.S. Constitution 
Just like its political system, America's monetary system 
changed dramatically when the United States adopted a 
Constitution, in 1788. Before that, many different forms of 
paper money circulated widely in this country. These mon-
ies could not be redeemed for specie (gold or silver); they 
were generally known as bills of credit. During the coloni-
al period, each colony could and did issue its own such 
bills. During the Revolutionary War, the federal govern-
ment paid its expenses by issuing what are perhaps the 
best-known of these bills, the continentals. And after the 
war, many states continued the practice of issuing their 
own bills of credit. All these monies generally circulated 
against specie and against each other at varying exchange 
rates. The U.S. Constitution changed all that. Along with 
the political union, the Constitution created a monetary 
union: it eliminated exchange rate variability by giving 
only the federal government the power to issue any form 
of money. 
Why the states agreed to give up that power is a ques-
tion that scholars have not yet adequately answered. Con-
ventional explanations, such as the fear of inflation or the 
desire to control what money qualified as legal tender, are 
unsatisfactory because they do not quite fit the facts. 
We think we have a better explanation. Specifically, we 
see evidence that the colonies and the states experienced 
exchange rate variability and found it undesirable, and we 
conclude that achieving a monetary union to eliminate that 
variability was a primary goal of the constitutional prohibi-
tion against bills of credit. This leaves us with a puzzle, 
though. Why was there such enthusiasm for the prohibition 
of state-issued money when the states could have achieved 
the same end by just fixing rates without giving up their 
power to issue money? 
The answer is suggested by both theory and evidence. 
By applying a theory of the demand for money in which 
monies are perfect substitutes for each other, we argue that 
fixing exchange rates leaves issuers with too much control 
over the money supply and creates a seigniorage problem. 
This theory is supported by what happened to a group of 
colonies when they experimented with such a monetary 
union. A seigniorage problem arose when one colony in 
the group began to tax its neighbors by issuing excessive 
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amounts of money. In essence, this behavior caused the 
system to fail. Thus, a better explanation for the constitu-
tional prohibition against state-issued bills of credit is that 
the states wanted a viable monetary union that would not 
only eliminate exchange rate variability but would also 
avoid the seigniorage problem inherent in fixed exchange 
rate systems. 
Inadequate Explanations 
Throughout most of the colonial period (1690-1776), the 
Revolutionary War (1776-83), and the Confederation 
(1783-89), irredeemable currencies like bills of credit 
were widely used. That much is clear. What is less clear 
is why the framers of the Constitution wanted to prohibit 
their use. We examine two commonly offered explanations 
for that prohibition and point out where they are lacking. 
The use of bills of credit began early in the history of 
the United States. During the colonial period, govern-
ments' expenditures quite often exceeded revenues. Since 
England largely prohibited the colonies from coining spe-
cie or chartering banks, colonial governments had to find 
other ways to obtain funds. Irredeemable monies, mainly 
bills of credit, became an extremely popular way to get 
around the British mandate. (See the Appendix for a de-
tailed history of the use of bills of credit.) 
Despite the widespread use of bills of credit, article I, 
section 10, of the U.S. Constitution explicitly prohibited 
the states, but not the federal government, from issuing 
them any more: 
No State shall... coin Money; emit Bills of Credit [empha-
sis added]; make any thing but gold and silver Coin a Ten-
der in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post 
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. 
Surprisingly, this issue caused very little debate. In fact, it 
received the largest favorable majority of any at the Con-
stitutional Convention (McGuire and Ohsfeldt 1986, p. 99, 
vote 9). 
Two explanations have often been offered for the pro-
hibition against state-issued bills of credit. One explana-
tion is based on the memory of the depreciation of the 
continental. This irredeemable money was issued in such 
large quantities that it often accounted for more than 80 
percent of the federal government's income (Ferguson 
1961, pp. 43-44), and its depreciation rate was severe dur-
ing the Revolutionary War years. According to this expla-
nation, people vehemently opposed state-issued irredeem-
able money because the memory of their losses from the 
continentals was so strong. This view appears explicitly in 
Calomiris 1988, but it is certainly implicit or explicit in 
other literature. 
We think there are several reasons to doubt this expla-
nation. One reason is that it suggests the federal govern-
ment should also have been prohibited from issuing bills 
of credit. But although this prohibition was considered, it 
was not enacted. A second cause for doubt is that during 
the Confederation period, states that had issued paper mon-
ey (for instance, Pennsylvania) experienced deflations as 
large as the wartime inflation. Also unanswered are the 
questions of how and why seven states issued irredeem-
able paper monies during the Confederation period, if the 
fear of inflation was really so strong. Finally, this explana-
tion fails to account for why the Federalist papers (Hamil-
ton, Madison, and Jay 1788, no. 44, p. 298) refer only to 
"the loss which America has sustained since the peace 
[emphasis added], from the pestilent effects of paper mon-
ey." That is, there is no reference to the problems that arose 
during the Revolution, when the continentals were depre-
ciating wildly. 
The second conventional explanation is that the consti-
tutional prohibition was attractive because a combination 
of state issues of paper money and state legal tender laws 
disrupted commerce, particularly interstate commerce. This 
view, offered by Nevins (1924, chap. 12) and Schweitzer 
(1989), argues that some states or colonies issued curren-
cy, allowed it to depreciate, and then passed laws prevent-
ing creditors in other areas from extracting payment in any 
other form from the area's debtors. To the extent that this 
practice was followed, it acted as a one-time tax on inter-
state or intercolony transactions using credit. 
Of course, what enforced the use of depreciated state 
currency issues were the legal tender laws passed by the 
states themselves. Schweitzer (1989, p. 322) concludes 
that "it was the damage of legal tender laws to interstate 
relations, rather than the possibility of bank notes or the 
memory of Continentals, that resulted in the Constitutional 
prohibition of state paper money." 
Indeed, Rhode Island and North Carolina, which had 
made their paper money a legal tender for payment of pri-
vate debts at par, created a stir when their monies depreci-
ated. Some states retaliated by passing their own legal ten-
der laws or by prohibiting the circulation of other states' 
money, and interstate commerce was disrupted. Thus Nev-
ins (1924, p. 570) argues that "the worst State disputes 
connected with currency arose from the enactment of 
measures impairing the obligation of contracts" which in-
cluded "the making of depreciated paper a legal tender for 
3 debts." And Schweitzer (1989, p. 318) asserts that "many 
believed that tender laws were increasingly causing fric-
tion between states." She quotes James Madison (Schweit-
zer 1989, p. 319) to the effect that paper money "is pro-
ducing the same warfare and retaliation among the states 
as were produced by the State regulations of commerce." 
This explanation is also rather weak. If interference with 
private debt contracts was the problem, the framers of the 
Constitution could have simply prohibited (as they did) 
the states from making anything but gold and silver a le-
gal tender for payment of private debts—a point raised by 
Madison in the debates at the Constitutional Convention 
(U.S. 1787, p. 445). Yet the framers went beyond that. 
A Better Explanation 
We think that a better explanation for the constitutional 
prohibition against state currencies is the states' desire to 
create a monetary union, that is, to eliminate exchange rate 
variability. To support this point of view, we show not on-
ly that the bills of credit issued by the various colonies or 
states fluctuated in value against specie and against each 
other, but also that this exchange rate variability was re-
garded as a significant trade problem by the colonies and 
states. 
Variable Exchange Rates . . . 
• The Colonial Period 
Exchange rates during the colonial period have been the 
subject of extensive study by McCusker (1978), and his 
study shows that exchange rates were variable among the 
colonial monies. He states that Pennsylvania's and Dela-
ware's money exchanged against each other at a variable 
rate, with Delaware's money at a discount that "regularly 
ranged between 5 and 10 percent" (McCusker 1978, p. 
182). Fluctuations in exchange rates between other coloni-
al monies can be inferred from his data on the exchange 
rate between London's pound sterling and the currencies 
of individual colonies. For example, his data imply that in 
1761, Virginia's money appreciated 14.5 percent against 
Massachusetts' money and then depreciated 6.5 percent 
and 9.7 percent in 1762 and 1763, respectively. His data 
also imply that in 1761, New York's money appreciated 
5.2 percent against Massachusetts' money and then depre-
ciated 4.3 percent and 4.4 percent in 1762 and 1763, re-
spectively (McCusker 1978, pp. 142, 211, 165). 
• The Revolutionary War 
In contrast to data on exchange rates during the colonial 
period, data on exchange rates during the Revolutionary 
War years are sparse. Nevertheless, the data that do exist 
clearly show that exchange rates continued to fluctuate 
among the various monies. Exchange rate fluctuations can 
also be inferred from the fact that the depreciation experi-
ence among the different monies was not uniform. 
Depreciation was most severe for the federal money, 
the continental. In January 1777, $1.25 worth of continen-
tals was required to purchase $1.00 in specie. By January 
1781, $100 worth of continentals was required to purchase 
$1.00 in specie. 
State monies also depreciated, but the rate of deprecia-
tion varied widely, as the following examples reveal: 
• Pennsylvania's paper money held its value much bet-
ter than most states'. Between 1780 and 1783, the 
state issued its island money, a form of bills of credit 
(Nevins 1924, p. 489). This money exchanged with 
specie at a rate anywhere between 1.25 to 1 and 5 to 
1 (Bezanson 1951, p. 345, Appendix, Table 4). 
• Maryland, in 1780, redeemed its paper money for 
specie at the rate of 40 to 1 (Nevins 1924, p. 485, n. 
18; Behrens 1923, p. 64). 
• North Carolina, in 1781, rated $200 of its paper mon-
ey to $1 specie; in 1782 this rate was revised to 800 
to 1 (Morrill 1969, pp. 19-20). 
• Virginia, in 1781, exchanged newly issued loan cer-
tificates, a form of bills of credit, with a face value of 
$1 for $1,000 of its previously issued currency (Nev-
ins 1924, p. 486). 
• South Carolina's paper money was "almost worth-
less" by the final year of fighting, and "it became 
necessary for Governor Rutledge ... to suspend the 
laws making it a legal tender" (Nevins 1924, p. 488). 
• The Confederation 
Exchange rate variability was also persistent throughout 
the Confederation period. Even in states where the rates 
of depreciation were rather mild, exchange rate variability 
was still present. For example, the ratio of Pennsylvania 
state currency values to specie fluctuated, according to 
Bezanson (1951, p. 345, Appendix, Table 4), between 
1.05 and 1.12 in 1786, between 1.10 and 1.75 in 1787, 
between 1.43 and 1.56 in 1788, and between 1.13 and 
1.43 in 1789. Thus, while Pennsylvania currency held its 
value relatively well by the standards of the time, holders 
of its currency were still subject to exchange rate risk. 
Other states experienced less well-documented fluctua-
tions in the relative values of different currencies. Accord-
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ing to Ferguson (1961, p. 244), "New Jersey's legal tender 
bills were fairly steady [in value], although they passed 
outside the state at a slowly increasing discount." In par-
ticular, New Jersey's paper currency had a stabler value 
internally than it did in either New York City or Philadel-
phia—a fact which led to political tension between New 
Jersey and its neighbors. Kaminski (1972, pp. 119-20) 
tells us that "New Jersey's tender provisions could not be 
enforced in the neighboring states, and consequently de-
preciation began in both Philadelphia and New York.... 
Before long, the depreciation in the neighboring states af-
fected the Jersey currency's value at home." In "non-spec-
ulative ventures" within its own borders, New Jersey cur-
rency went at a discount against specie of between 7 and 
15 percent (Kaminski 1972, p. 124). As early as May 
1787, it was at a discount between 12 and 18 percent in 
New York. The analogous discount in Philadelphia at the 
same time was between 11 and 20 percent. In 1788, New 
Jersey currency was discounted by only 7 percent in New 
York, but by 33 percent in Philadelphia. By 1789, the dis-
count was 33 percent in both New York and Philadelphia. 
(See Kaminski 1972, p. 125.) 
In New York, bills of credit were at times at a discount 
of as much as 10 percent relative to specie. However, in 
the midsummer of 1787, newspapers "boasted that they 
were 'universally received upon a par with gold or silver'" 
(Nevins 1924, p. 528; Kaminski 1972, pp. 155, 158). 
South Carolina may have had the stablest money dur-
ing this period. According to Nevins (1924, pp. 526-27), 
"The paper held its value .... Such was its success that 
in 1789, when specie dollars were pouring into Charleston 
it was preferred as being more convenient to use." 
The paper monies of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New 
York, and South Carolina fluctuated in value relative to 
specie, and in the cases of New York and South Carolina 
in particular, these fluctuations appear to have been rela-
tively small. This was not the case for the currencies of 
Rhode Island and North Carolina, which experienced more 
sustained and dramatic depreciation. 
Rhode Island's currency depreciated rapidly. It circulat-
ed at 1/10 of its face value by 1788 (Ferguson 1961, p. 
243) and at 1/12 of its face value by 1789 (Nevins 1924, 
p. 540). Finally, Nevins (1924, pp. 540-41) says, "in the 
autumn of 1789, the Legislature repealed the law making 
the bills a legal tender at par, and fixed the value at which 
it should be received by creditors, in satisfaction of awards 
in lawsuits, at one-fifteenth the value of specie." Thus, 
Rhode Island money depreciated markedly not only rela-
tive to specie; it also did so relative to the monies of the 
other states. 
The money issued by North Carolina did no better. Ac-
cording to Morrill (1969, p. 70), it quickly "depreciated to 
an average of about 25 per cent off specie in the purchase 
of commodities and then stabilized at about 12.5 per cent 
to 15 per cent off nominal value when exchanged for hard 
money." This depreciation was largely complete by late in 
1783, "after which time the paper's value remained practi-
cally steady for two years" (Morrill 1969, p. 71). However, 
by the end of 1785, the state's money "slipped from about 
25 per cent off nominal value to perhaps 35 per cent off 
par, while in exchange for specie the currency declined 
from about 15 per cent off par to about 25 per cent off 
nominal value" (Morrill 1969, p. 75). The paper was about 
33 percent below specie by 1786 and 40 percent below by 
1787. In 1789, it reached 50 percent of nominal value, 
where it remained well into the next decade.
1 
. . . Impeded Trade 
During the formative years of the United States, then, the 
currencies issued by the colonies and the states proliferat-
ed, and their rates of exchange varied considerably. The 
colonies and states found that this variability added to the 
cost of transactions across borders. 
• Virginia, 1755-64 
Colonial monetary affairs were subject to British over-
sight, and as time passed, monetary relations between Brit-
ain and the colonies became an increasing source of fric-
tion. Such frictions came to a head between Britain and 
Virginia between 1755 and 1764. The result was the Cur-
rency Act of 1764 in which the colonies were forbidden 
from making their own paper currency legal tender for 
payment of public or private debts.
2 
Virginia was the last colony to issue paper money. 
When it first issued paper money in 1755, the colony was 
desperately short of specie (Ernst 1973, p. 15; Brock 1975, 
p. 468). Colonists who borrowed from English merchants, 
which was a widespread practice at the time, had incurred 
sterling-denominated debts. These debts were routinely 
(and necessarily) repaid in local currency, which was a 
legal tender. But the rate of exchange between Virginia 
'North Carolina's currency continued to circulate for some time after the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution. The Constitution prohibited the issue of new state currency, but 
did not require the retirement of old state currency issues (Morrill 1969, pp. 87-92). 
2More specifically, the 1764 act applied to the colonies outside of New England. 
The New England colonies were covered by the Currency Act of 1751. 
5 currency and sterling was subject to some fluctuation.
3 
Given the legal tender status of Virginia's currency, 
British creditors could not avoid repayment in this form. 
However, British creditors objected strenuously to being 
subjected to exchange rate risk. In 1758, British merchants 
petitioned the crown demanding "absolute protection 
against any fluctuations in the rate of exchange. Such risks 
were to be borne by the Virginians alone" (Ernst 1973, p. 
52). Exchange rate risk, and who was to bear it, then be-
came a subject of heated political discussion on both sides 
of the Atlantic. 
In response to British pressure, Virginia law was 
amended in 1755 "to allow courts of record to settle all 
executions for sterling debts in local currency—paper as 
well as coin—at a 'just' rate of exchange. A just rate was 
taken to be the actual rate at the time of court judgment" 
(Ernst 1973, p. 54). This became the common legal prac-
tice. 
British creditors, however, viewed even this as inade-
quate protection against exchange rate variation. Virginia 
law allowed an exchange rate to be set at the time of legal 
settlement, but British merchants wanted more. They want-
ed protection against exchange rate variation between the 
time of settlement and the time of payment. They also 
wanted the option of consenting "to accept paper money 
in amounts they deemed necessary for the purchase of ster-
ling bills of exchange to the original and full value of ster-
ling debts" (Ernst 1973, p. 52). 
This was unacceptable to Virginia. In addition to forc-
ing Virginians to bear all exchange rate risk in exchanges 
with Britain, such an agreement would have given British 
merchants bargaining power over Virginians who had on-
ly local currency as a means of payment.
4 
Thus, the question of who was to bear exchange rate 
risk between Britain and the colonies was hotly debated. 
Of course, the same issue existed among the colonies 
themselves, but here they had less freedom of independent 
action. One method for eliminating exchange rate variabil-
ity would have been to create (or to attempt to create) a 
uniform North American currency. Such a proposal was 
in fact made by Benjamin Franklin in 1765, and a similar 
proposal had been made in Britain in 1763 (Ernst 1973, 
pp. 78-79, 97-105). Indeed, the Stamp Act (of 1765) was 
originally intended to raise funds to support a uniform 
North American currency. Thus, even at this early date, 
interest in creating a uniform currency manifested itself, 
but some time was to elapse before a uniform currency 
was actually created. 
• The Confederation 
During the Revolution and continuing into the Confedera-
tion period, interstate commerce was of growing impor-
tance.
5 This trend suggests the desirability of a medium of 
exchange to be used in interstate transactions. 
Several candidates for a common interstate money ex-
isted. One was specie. However, its usefulness for this pur-
pose was reduced by the fact that it seems often to have 
passed by weight. Another candidate was indents, which 
were basically bills of credit issued by the federal govern-
ment. This was the intent of Congress under the Articles 
of Confederation. (See the Appendix for details.) How-
ever, the value of indents was not uniform across states. 
A third candidate was one or more of the various state 
monies. That a state money was, in fact, used in interstate 
transactions is indicated by the observation that Pennsyl-
vania money circulated in "Maryland, central Virginia, 
and the Ohio Valley; and North Carolina currency [circu-
lated] in western Virginia and Kentucky" (Schweitzer 
1989, p. 315). Nevertheless, the use of a state money in 
interstate transactions (as well as at home) was plagued by 
exchange rate uncertainty. 
Consider the problems with Pennsylvania's money, a 
money which maintained its value far better than that of 
some other states. According to Bezanson (1951, p. 326), 
in the spring of 1789, Pennsylvania merchant James Cox 
wrote that "the very fluctuating state that our paper money 
has always been in, makes it difficult to ascertain the val-
ue of it at different periods." An illustration of the per-
ceived costs of this exchange rate variability is the fact that 
the members of the Pennsylvania assembly refused to be 
paid in Pennsylvania money, which was a legal tender for 
the payment of public, but not private, debts (Kaminski 
1972, p. 70). 
An even more dramatic illustration is the attitude of the 
Bank of North America toward the money of its own state, 
Pennsylvania. The Bank of North America, chartered in 
3However, in Virginia's case, the fluctuation was hardly dramatic. See McCusker 
1978 or Smith 1985a. 
4If Virginians had been forced to bear all exchange rate risk, one can ask what the 
incidence of this tax might have been. In particular, goods prices or interest rates or 
both might have adjusted to compensate them (partially) for bearing this risk. Whatever 
the incidence, however, any departure from optimal risk-sharing represents a source of 
inefficiency. Moreover, British creditors were apparently willing to bear whatever price 
adjustments resulted in order to shed their exposure to exchange rate risk. Thus, an im-
passe was reached, leading to the Currency Act of 1764. Again, this act prevented the 
colonies from making their own currencies a legal tender in payment of public or pri-
vate debts. 
5For some quantification of the importance of interstate trade, see Bjork 1963. 
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1781, had successfully circulated its bank notes for several 
years. In an effort to dissuade Pennsylvania from issuing 
its own paper money, the Bank announced that it would 
refuse to accept the state's money (at any discount) in 
transactions. This did not dissuade Pennsylvania; instead 
it led to a revocation of the Bank's charter. In an effort to 
regain its charter, "the Bank yielded and offered to receive 
state paper money on deposit, provided these paper trans-
actions were kept 'entirely distinct and separate' from the 
specie accounts" (Kaminski 1972, p. 64). This the Bank 
did, keeping accounts in Pennsylvania money completely 
distinct from specie accounts, even though the state's 
money did not initially depreciate. The Bank actually did 
receive a substantial quantity of state paper money, and 
keeping separate accounts led to a "considerable extra ex-
pense to the Bank" (Kaminski 1972, p. 67). Apparently, 
this was a cost the Bank was willing to absorb in order to 
avoid exchange rate risk. (Recall that Pennsylvania curren-
cy fluctuated in value, rather than depreciating uniformly.) 
New Jersey faced a similar problem with its money. 
Nevins (1924, pp. 569-70) points out that four systems of 
legal valuation of specie were in place among the different 
states and then argues that 
these difficulties were accentuated by the total unreliability 
of the paper currencies. It was hard for even well-informed 
citizens to understand what value to attach to a handful of 
bills, and the tables of exchange between States would have 
filled a fat volume .... A man could not be sure that what 
was sound money in one county would pass when he had 
crossed an imaginary line, nor that if his bills did pass, he 
would not be charged a ruinous discount. 
Some of the costs this exchange rate uncertainty imposed 
are illustrated by the problems that even New Jersey's 
Governor Livingston had in making out-of-state transac-
tions. The Governor, who 
naturally did much business in New York city, found it so 
impossible to use Jersey money "at the unconscionable dis-
count which your brokers and merchants exact" that he col-
lected what New York money was due him and saved it to 
employ across the Hudson. 
A Puzzle Solved 
Simply arguing that the intent of the Constitution's article 
I, section 10, was to eliminate exchange rate variability 
among different currencies leaves us with a puzzle, though: 
the desired result could have been accomplished by just re-
quiring the states to fix the exchange rates of their paper 
monies against a common currency. So why did the fram-
ers of the Constitution go to the extreme of prohibiting 
states from issuing bills of credit?
6 Understanding this is 
difficult if we take the conventional view that, for transac-
tion purposes, different currencies are imperfect substitutes 
even when exchange rates are fixed. The puzzle can be 
solved, however, if we take the view that when exchange 
rates are fixed, monies become perfect substitutes; that is, 
they become interchangeable in transactions. 
Theory 
Under the conventional view of the demand for money, 
there is no need to prohibit states from issuing bills of 
credit. A well-defined demand function exists for each 
money; monies are not perfect substitutes. Exchange rates 
are determined by the relative demand for real balances of 
different currencies. Under this view, the solution to the 
exchange rate problem would have been to require the 
states to peg the value of their bills of credit to a common 
currency, not to prohibit the states from issuing them alto-
gether. Such a solution would have restricted the growth 
rate of each state's money. But it would have allowed the 
states to retain the ability to collect seigniorage revenue 
should the real demand for their currency increase—say, 
due to economic growth—an option that would clearly 
have been to their advantage.
7 
Under an alternative view of the demand for money, 
however, there is a need for the prohibition. Indeed, the 
prohibition becomes the states' logical response to a costly 
problem. According to this view, when exchange rates are 
fixed, currencies issued by different sovereignties are per-
fect substitutes for each other. From this perspective, pro-
hibiting states from issuing bills of credit avoids the sei-
gniorage problem inherent with fixed exchange rates. 
The view that in a monetary union with fixed exchange 
rates, different currencies would be perfect substitutes is 
motivated by the observation that under such an arrange-
ment all monies have, by definition, the same real rates of 
return. Consequently, if people choose a currency solely on 
the basis of its real rate of return, they will view all cur-
rencies as the same. 
6The same issue of whether fixed exchange rates or a single currency is more de-
sirable is currently being debated in regard to the proposed monetary union in Europe. 
Those favoring a single currency for Europe usually argue that, "a single currency es-
tablishes the credibility and longevity of a monetary union in a way that 'irrevocably' 
fixed exchange rates across multiple currencies do not" (Bean 1992, p. 39). Following 
this line of reasoning, one could argue that the prohibition on state issuance of bills of 
credit was included in the Constitution to make it more difficult for the states to opt out 
of the monetary union at a later time. 
7 See Bean 1992 for one example of the conventional view and its implications for 
a sovereign state's control over its money supply. 
7 Models of money that incorporate such a perfect sub-
stitutes view have been studied by Kareken and Wallace 
(1981) and by King, Wallace, and Weber (1992). Kareken 
and Wallace use a model in which people choose among 
currencies solely on the basis of real returns. When the ex-
change rate between two currencies does not change, the 
currencies will have the same rates of return and people 
will be indifferent as to which they hold. The Kareken-
Wallace model thus shows that exchange rates are indeter-
minate in the sense that any unchanging exchange rate be-
tween two currencies is consistent with an equilibrium.
8 
Exchange rate indeterminacy is resolved by fixing rates; 
however, another indeterminacy then arises. Specifically, 
Kareken and Wallace (1981) show that when exchange 
rates among monies are fixed, the individual money sup-
plies are indeterminate in the sense that any time paths for 
two monies are consistent with an equilibrium.
9 Conse-
quently, and contrary to the conventional view of the de-
mand for money, a fixed exchange rate regime places no 
particular restrictions on the growth rate of any sovereign 
state's money supply. 
This money supply indeterminacy directly gives rise to 
a seigniorage problem: governments can collect seignior-
age revenue from citizens outside their jurisdiction and 
thereby redistribute income to their own citizens.
1
0
 That is, 
states with money stocks growing faster than the average 
will be able to collect seigniorage from the citizens of 
states with money stocks growing slower than the average. 
If governments exploit the opportunity to collect sei-
gniorage revenue from citizens outside their jurisdiction, 
their actions can jeopardize the existence of such a mone-
tary union. If one state collects seigniorage from the citi-
zens of other states, then those states bearing the implied 
tax may choose to retaliate in any one of several ways. 
They could increase their own rate of money creation as 
a way of getting back their seigniorage income. The result 
might be high inflation, which would dilute the benefits of 
a monetary union. High inflation might also lead some 
states to impose controls to limit the use of currency other 
than their own and thereby limit the amount of seignior-
age revenue other states could raise at their expense. In 
the extreme, this inflation could lead some states to opt 
out of the monetary union. Thus, under this view, a mone-
tary union with fixed exchange rates among irredeemable 
paper currencies is likely to be difficult to maintain unless 
institutional arrangements are made to resolve this sei-
gniorage problem. 
Evidence 
So far in this section, we have discussed the seigniorage 
problem as a theoretical possibility that only arises in a 
special class of economic models. But there is historical ev-
idence to suggest that it is of practical significance as 
well: this very problem arose in New England during the 
colonial period. 
By 1710, all of the New England colonies had issued 
their own bills of credit, and these bills moved freely 
across colonial borders. Even though there was no official 
government enforcement of fixed exchange rates, Brock 
(1975, p. 35) says, "the bills of the several New England 
colonies customarily, although not always, passed current 
in all the rest at a uniform value." In other words, the ex-
change rates among the currencies of these colonies were 
constant at a rate of 1 to 1. This constancy of exchange 
rates implies, in turn, the potential for any one colony to 
levy the seigniorage tax on its neighbors. 
This potential did not go unexploited, and Rhode Is-
land was the culprit. As Brock (1975, p. 39) tells us, "the 
fact that Rhode Island bills circulated widely in other col-
onies permitted her to levy tribute on her neighbors." Be-
tween 1710 and 1744, the New England money supply 
grew at an average rate of 7.7 percent per year; over the 
same period, the supply of Rhode Island bills of credit 
grew at an average rate of almost 14 percent per year 
(Brock 1975, pp. 591-92). Most of this increase went into 
circulation in other colonies. Again according to Brock 
(1975, p. 41), "it was estimated that as many as five-sixths 
of the Rhode Island bills were absorbed by Massachu-
setts." By 1744, 43 percent of the New England money 
8There is an issue as to whether the exchange rate indeterminacy result of Kareken 
and Wallace 1981 applies when one or more of the currencies is to be retired. The re-
sult certainly applies if currency is only retired asymptotically, which is not an implau-
sible description of the events we have described. It can also apply if the currency is 
retired in finite time. 
King, Wallace, and Weber (1992) modify the Kareken-Wallace analysis to allow 
for uncertainty. In the modified economy, agents choose among currencies based on 
their rate of return distributions. King, Wallace, and Weber show that the exchange rate 
can be variable because the Kareken-Wallace indeterminacy extends to a large class 
of random processes for exchange rates, where the randomness is nonfundamental. See 
also Shell 1977, Azariadis 1981, and Cass and Shell 1983 for a discussion of the relat-
ed notion of a sunspot equilibrium. Of course, in the economy of King, Wallace, and 
Weber, requiring individual sovereign states to fix their exchange rates against a com-
mon currency would eliminate the exchange rate variability. 
9King, Wallace, and Weber (1992) also show that under a fixed exchange rate re-
gime, the indeterminacy of money supplies extends to a wide class of random process-
es for the money supplies. 
10For other discussions of the seigniorage incentive problem in monetary unions, 
see Case 11a and Feinstein 1989 and Zarazaga 1991. 
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supply had been issued by Rhode Island, which had only 
about 10 percent of New England's population (Brock 
1975, p. 592). 
Given the high rate of seigniorage taxation levied by 
Rhode Island on its neighbors, it is not surprising that con-
stant exchange rates did not persist. According to Brock 
(1975, p. 314, n. 117), the citizens of Norwich and New 
Haven, Connecticut, petitioned the colonial assembly to 
do something about the circulation of Rhode Island bills. 
In 1747 (or 1748), the Norwich petitioners complained 
that 
the Rhode Islanders have the Last Fall Sapped our Interest 
by buying up [with] Their pernicious bills our best provisions 
. . . and are now out buying up our Cows & best Stock [,] 
what They can with Those same pernicious bills. 
In 1751, the merchants in New Haven complained that 
the colony of Rhode Island by their present Large unequal 
proportion of outstanding bills are Enabled Annually to buy 
off A great part of the produce of this Colony the Labour of 
an Industrious people, to the no Small Detriment of the In-
habitants of this colony. 
In May 1752, the Connecticut assembly agreed to prohibit 
the circulation of Rhode Island bills issued after 1750. 
Massachusetts also grew disillusioned with this curren-
cy system. In 1749, Governor Hutchinson of Massachu-
setts proposed the retirement of the colony's own paper 
currency, after which "no person should receive or pay 
within the province bills of credit of any of the other gov-
ernments of New England" (Brock 1975, pp. 249-50). In 
1749, Massachusetts passed a law prohibiting the circula-
tion of other New England currencies within its borders, 
with a fine of 50 pounds for a violation. 
Thus, the informal monetary union achieved in New 
England broke down, and the failure was due to Rhode Is-
land's attempts to collect seigniorage from its neighbors. 
Conclusion 
We are not the first to try to explain the willingness of the 
individual states in the United States to give up their pow-
er to issue money. Nevertheless, we think other explana-
tions are inadequate. We think that the motivation behind 
the constitutional prohibition against bills of credit was the 
states' desire to eliminate exchange rate variability and 
avoid the seigniorage problem that otherwise occurs in a 
fixed exchange rate system. 
The formative years of the United States help illustrate 
why a monetary union is desirable, yet difficult to main-
tain. During these years, exchange rate variability was 
viewed as significant and costly. Further, the New En-
gland experience of Rhode Island trying to impose a sei-
gniorage tax on its neighbors supports our contention that 
a monetary union cannot be maintained simply by requir-
ing the states to fix exchange rates. As we have seen, fix-
ing exchange rates among paper currencies places no lim-
its on the ability of individual states to raise seigniorage 
revenue. In order to form a more perfect monetary union, 
therefore, the framers of the Constitution avoided this sei-
niorage problem by prohibiting the states from issuing 
bills of credit. 
9 Appendix 
A History of Bills of Credit in America 
In the preceding paper, we refer only briefly to the widespread 
use of bills of credit during the formative years of the United 
States. Here we present a more detailed history of their use by 
the American colonies before the Revolutionary War, by the 
states and the Continental Congress during the war, and then by 
the newly formed country during the years from 1783 to 1789, 
the so-called Confederation period. (For an overview of some 
of the issues we discuss, see Sylla 1982.) 
The Colonial Period 
Since England largely prohibited the American colonies from 
coining specie and chartering banks, colonial governments had 
to find other methods of deficit finance. Bills of credit were 
widely used for this purpose by all the colonies, the states, and 
the federal government until their constitutional prohibition in 
1788. 
Massachusetts issued the first bills of credit in 1690. They 
were used to pay troops when tax revenue was insufficient. All 
the other colonies eventually followed Massachusetts' lead. In 
order to promote the use and value of bills of credit, they were 
usually made acceptable for tax payments at a fixed rate in terms 
of specie.
1 
The colonies issued bills of credit in two general ways. One 
was to create what was called a loan office in order to lend the 
bills at interest. While this money was not redeemable in specie, 
most enabling legislation for such issues required money issues 
to be retired as loans were repaid. These provisions were more 
adhered to in some colonies than in others, however. The inter-
est on loans was used to fund general expenditures. In colonies 
with well-run loan offices, interest income often financed all 
peacetime expenditures, and taxes were only levied in wartime. 
The other way of issuing paper money was simply to use bills 
of credit in government transactions. In all colonies, enabling 
legislation for this type of money issue also included provisions 
for future taxes to be used to retire the currency. Again, some 
colonies adhered to the provisions better than others. 
The Revolutionary War 
Bills of credit became an important source of government fi-
nancing during the Revolutionary War. Since the ability of the 
federal and state governments to raise taxes was limited, as the 
war expenditures grew they relied heavily on paper money. 
When the Revolutionary War began, the Continental Con-
gress had no power to tax. To meet its revenue needs, it was 
forced to rely on loans and debt, requisitions from state govern-
ments, and bills of credit. However, loans and debt provided lit-
tle income, and the legality of the state governments was often 
poorly established. Even when their legality was well estab-
lished, the states had little in the way of a tax collection appara-
tus. Thus, states' own revenue collections were not large, and 
they were reluctant to give what they did collect to the Conti-
nental Congress. As a result, the federal government had to rely 
heavily on its own bills of credit, known as continentals, to fi-
nance its expenditures. Indeed, during the 1775-79 period, bills 
of credit accounted for 82 percent of the federal government's 
income (Ferguson 1961, pp. 43-44). 
The proliferation of continentals that permitted this seignior-
age revenue to be raised is well known. The Continental Con-
gress issued over $226 million of continentals between June 
1775 and the end of 1779, after which it ceased all issues.
2 
Since the Continental Congress had no powers of taxation, it re-
quested that the states make Continentals acceptable for taxes at 
a fixed rate in terms of specie. The legislation that authorized 
the first issue of continentals provided for them to be retired 
with taxes collected from the states; such legislation did not ac-
company later issues, however. Consequently, state retirements 
of continentals through taxation were very limited.
3 
1 For a discussion of different colonial experiences, see Ferguson 1953; Ernst 1973; 
Brock 1975; McCusker 1978; Smith 1985a,b, and 1988; Wicker 1985; or Perkins 1992. 
Smith (1985a,b) explains how temporary monetization of deficits was consistent with 
stable currency values. 
2The figure $226 million is Ferguson's (1961, p. 30) estimate; slightly different fig-
ures are cited by other authors. 
Also, while continentals ceased to be issued after 1779, a variety of other circulat-
ing liabilities were issued by the federal government after that year. See the discussion 
in the next footnote. 
3 Another type of federal government certificate, which had been in use since 1776, 
was a draft drawn on various departments of the government. According to Ferguson 
(1961, p. 57), these sorts of certificates "were issued by all the departments in lieu of 
money." At first merely handwritten notes, they later became printed forms. But "from 
the beginning they were connected with impressment," so they were exchanged (invol-
untarily) for supplies. Ferguson (1961, p. 63) estimates that "the certificates issued by 
federal officers must have approximated, in nominal amount, the entire sum of Conti-
nental currency." The certificates were irredeemable, bore no interest, and were issued 
in fixed nominal amounts. They apparently tended to be of even less value than conti-
nentals (Ferguson 1961, p. 65, n. 26), although Nevins (1924, p. 505) asserts that "it 
was often difficult, in practise, to distinguish between the certificates and paper mon-
ey." And, in fact, the certificates did serve certain functions of money, since they were 
accepted by some states for taxes after February 1780. The Continental Congress began 
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The states also issued bills of credit during the Revolutionary 
War. All told, Nevins (1924, p. 481) says, "the specie value of 
the currency issued by the States during the Revolution was es-
timated by Jefferson in 1786 at $36,000,000, or just as much as 
the specie value of the Continental currency."
4 
The Confederation 
The end of the Revolutionary War did not bring an end to Amer-
ica's use of bills of credit. They continued to be a common form 
of government financing both for the federal government and 
for the state governments. 
Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government 
was permitted to issue paper money, and it did so to help ser-
vice the considerable debt it had accumulated fighting the war. 
Although the federal government stopped paying interest on fed-
eral loan certificates in 1782, it resumed interest payments on 
these certificates two years later. It made these payments by is-
suing indents, a paper currency which in all major respects was 
a bill of credit. Ferguson (1961, p. 224) provides a description 
of how these bills of credit were meant to function: 
Indents were printed by the [federal] Treasury and deposited with 
the loan officers in each state, who turned them over to the local au-
thority. The states were then supposed to issue indents for interest 
due on public securities. . . . Congress had the notion that indents 
would flow freely across state borders and be taken indiscriminately 
by all states for taxes. Since they were printed in small denomina-
tions, ranging from one to twenty dollars, they would provide a na-
tional circulating medium. 
The indent system, which was in place throughout the Confed-
eration period, was thus meant to be a simultaneous solution to 
two problems: it was to provide both a means for financing debt 
service through a kind of money creation and a uniform medium 
for interstate transactions. During the years 1786-89, between 
$703,000 and $1,364,000 of indents were outstanding. (For fur-
ther evidence that indents circulated, see Bolles, 1884, pp. 324, 
326.) 
States were also allowed to issue their own money, and sev-
eral states reestablished to a large extent the monetary arrange-
ments that they had employed in the colonial period and during 
the war to service and retire debt.
5 Some of this debt was of their 
own issue, but many states also assumed responsibility for pay-
ing the interest on federal loans and debt held by their own resi-
dents when the Continental Congress stopped paying interest on 
them in 1782.
6 
Pennsylvania, for example, gave public creditors certificates 
of interest, and it made these certificates receivable for state tax 
payments. According to Ferguson (1961, p. 222), Pennsylvania 
"created in the process a kind of state paper money." These cer-
tificates of interest were essentially bills of credit, and they add-
ed to those already in existence from the Revolution. Thus, by 
early 1785, it was estimated that Pennsylvania had more than 
£160,000 in circulation.
7 In March 1785, Pennsylvania auth-
orized an issue of an additional £100,000 "to pay interest on all 
public securities held by citizens of the state" (Ferguson 1961, 
p. 229). Taxes and revenues from the sales of public lands were 
pledged to retire these issues.
8 Pennsylvania thus sought to fi-
nance debt service by the temporary creation of money, and the 
state issued £50,000 to create a loan office along colonial lines. 
All Pennsylvania currency issues were made receivable at face 
value for all payments to the state during this time. 
New Jersey issued a revenue money to its public creditors. In 
1786, it supplemented this revenue money by issuing £100,000 
of bills of credit through a loan office. To promote the accep-
tance of the currency, New Jersey implemented a set of taxes 
to be used to retire the money, a law making it legal tender for 
payment of public and private debts, and penalties for discrim-
inating between it and specie in transactions. 
New York also issued bills of credit in 1786. In that year, 
New York issued £50,000 for the purpose of paying the interest 
on outstanding debt. (That is, the state was engaged in a form 
of currency finance.) In addition, New York issued another 
£150,000 through a loan office. Nevins (1924, p. 528) tells us 
that the money "was made a legal tender for private debt only in 
case of suits." (For more on the New York experience, see 
Kaminski 1972, pp. 155, 158.) 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and North Carolina are ex-
amples of states that issued bills of credit during the Confedera-
tion period. In 1786, Rhode Island issued £100,000 through a 
accepting them from the states in payment of certain requisitions after March 1780. 
The last wartime issues of the federal government occurred in 1782 when Con-
gress decided to convert unliquidated public debts into a liquidated public debt. To this 
end, it appointed federal commissioners to inspect claims against the federal govern-
ment. Ferguson (1961, p. 179) tells us that "the commissioners verified claims and re-
valued them in specie if they were stated in terms of depreciated currency. For balances 
due they issued 'final settlement certificates' amounting to over $3,700,000." Final set-
tlement certificates, though, were also used in government payments. For instance, 
about $11 million (in specie value) of final settlement certificates were issued in troop 
payments (Ferguson 1961, p. 180). 
4The states also issued certificates of various sorts in addition to their explicit is-
sues of paper money. North Carolina, for instance, issued five different kinds of certifi-
cate debt over the 1778-82 period, with a nominal value in excess of $40 million. 
Some of these certificates bore a fixed nominal interest rate, some bore interest and were 
indexed to the value of specie, and some bore no interest. Some also had a special sta-
tus in certain kinds of payments to the state, while others did not. The result was that 
the relative values of different types of certificates varied. (See Morrill 1969 for a more 
complete discussion.) In addition, the states issued loan certificates which were analo-
gous to federal loan certificates. 
5See, for example, the work of Schweitzer (1989) or Ferguson (1961). The latter 
argues that during the Confederation period, "the various states were re-enacting their 
particular experience with paper money in colonial times" (Ferguson 1961, p. 244). 
6Some states (Massachusetts being the most prominent example) sought to raise 
the required revenue entirely through direct taxation. The result was high tax rates and, 
eventually, a tax rebellion (Shays' Rebellion of 1786-87). 
7The term pound did not mean the same thing in different states. We use it here 
as it was used to refer to the currency of the state in question. 
8And, in fact, £87,000 had been retired through these means by September 1788 
(Nevins 1924, p. 522). 
11 loan office. The state passed measures imposing penalties for 
discriminating in transactions between specie and the state mon-
ey. The measures also made the state money a legal tender for 
payment of private debts. South Carolina had exchanged its own 
state debt for federal debt held by its own citizens, so that during 
the Confederation period virtually all debt held in South Caro-
lina was state debt. The interest on this debt was paid by state 
issues of special indents. Ferguson (1961, p. 233, n. 31) esti-
mates that "the actual emission of indents varied from $273,000 
to $535,000 annually."
9 (For annual issues, see Higgins 1969, 
p. 245, n. 4.) These certificates were redeemed out of tax reve-
nue. In addition, £100,000 were issued through a loan office in 
1786. In North Carolina, the certificates issued during the Revo-
lution were accepted for property tax payments through 1786. 
To supplement the certificates (and partly to replace them), 
North Carolina issued new bills of credit. In 1783, £100,000 
were issued; and in 1785, another £100,000 were issued. The 
paper money was a legal tender for payment of all public and 
private debts. 
9Ferguson's (1961, p. 233) estimates for the South Carolina pound are "stated in 
terms of dollars at the rate of $4,286 to £1, which the legislature adopted in 1783." 
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